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1 In 2007, the global financial markets were hit by a ‘black swan event’, 
an event so unlikely to occur that it surprised policy makers as much as 
most economists (Taleb, 2007). The bursting of the housing bubble in 
the United States (US) and its domino effect on global financial institu-
tions after years of deregulation contributed to a rapid decline in inter-
national trade, credit availability and market confidence (Levchenko, 
Lewis and Tesar, 2010). Global economic imbalances, growing inequality 
and excessive liberalisation of the financial sector, as well as weaknesses 
in aggregate demand in both the US and Europe that had previously 
been disguised by weak regulation and low interest rates were among 
the underlying problems (Wolf, 2014). The result was the 2008–2012 
global recession, the likes of which had not been predicted or seen since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. Its intensity and symptoms varied 
cross-nationally, but for many countries involved a slowing down of 
their economic activity, an inability to finance budget deficits, and huge 
social costs in terms of rising unemployment and relative deprivation 
levels. 
 In the eurozone, the global economic downturn manifested in ‘three 
interlocking crises’ (see Shambaugh, 2012). First, there was a banking 
crisis, with major Euro-area banks experiencing a capital shortfall, as 
well as liquidity and solvency problems. Second, there was a sovereign 
debt crisis, with a number of Central and Eastern European countries, 
but also Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain facing rising bond 
yields and struggling to independently repay or refinance pre-existing 
and mounting government debts. Third, there was a competitiveness 
crisis, with slowing and unequal growth among eurozone members, 
which exacerbated the burden on the indebted nations. It soon 
became apparent that the interconnected and mutually reinforcing 
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nature of these three crises would not only undermine the viability of 
the currency union (Shambaugh, 2012: 157; Eichengreen, 2010) but 
would also, arguably, produce the greatest challenge the European 
integration project had faced since the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
 To curtail the development of the multifaceted crisis, the prevailing 
response and prescription from affected governments and international 
institutions was the adoption of austerity measures. Rather than an exact 
recipe, this ensuing ‘age of austerity’, still ongoing, is characterised by 
varying degrees (Ladi and Tsarouhas, 2014) and varying combinations 
of increases or decreases in spending, taxation and benefit entitlements 
(Melchiorre, 2013). For instance, in countries like France, Spain, Belgium 
and Slovakia, among others, austerity mainly took the form of increases 
in taxation, with a parallel increase in some areas of public spending. In 
most cases, including in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Estonia and the 
United Kingdom, increases in direct and indirect taxation were combined 
with extensive cuts in government spending and consumption. Whatever 
the combination of measures, both the economic wisdom of adopting 
austerity policies (e.g. Corsetti, 2012; Krugman, 2012; Wolf, 2014), as well 
as their social and political sustainability (e.g. Matsaganis and Leventi, 
2014) provoked intense and heated debates, with far-reaching implica-
tions that extend beyond Europe and beyond the current crisis. 
 Greece found itself at the epicentre of this global crisis. Following a 
decade of fast economic growth (about 4% on average from 2000–08; see 
Matsaganis, 2011a) and notable achievements, such as the hosting of the 
2004 Olympic Games, Greece was the first and most severely hit member 
of the eurozone. A number of long-standing structural problems (e.g., 
see Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008), such as its large, outdated 
and inefficient public sector, widespread corruption and systemic resist-
ance to reforms from organised interest groups (Kalyvas, Pagoulatos and 
Tsoukas, 2012), had made Greece particularly exposed to the wrath of 
the global economic downturn. The tipping point and the moment the 
severity of its sovereign debt problem became evident came in October 
2009, when the newly elected socialist government announced that the 
earlier reported fiscal data concerning government deficit and sovereign 
debt had been inaccurate. The projected deficit ratio for 2009 was at 
that point revised from 3.7% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the 
figure reported to Eurostat in spring 2009 – to 12.5% of GDP, with its 
public debt recalculated to 115.1% of GDP (see EC, 2010a). 
 Amidst fears of contagion across Europe and rapid increase of spreads 
on Greek bonds, the Greek government introduced a first package of 
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austerity measures in March 2010 and a tax reform in April 2010, 
which, however, failed to restore market confidence. With involun-
tary and disorderly default on its debt and exit from the eurozone 
emerging as real possibilities, in May 2010 the government sought 
and received an unprecedented €110 billion loan by the so-called 
‘troika’, consisting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC). The 
loan was conditional upon the implementation of extreme austerity 
measures and regular monitoring, as stipulated in the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU – henceforth ‘the Memorandum’) that was 
ratified by the Hellenic Parliament in May 2010 amidst mass protest 
(Rüdig and Karyotis, 2014). These included radical cuts in salaries 
and public spending, steep tax increases, privatisations and pension 
reforms, which collectively were described as ‘unexpectedly tough’ 
(Butler, 2010) but were expected to reduce the fiscal deficit below 3% 
of GDP by 2014 (IMF, 2010). 
 When these projections proved unfeasible due, among others, to the 
depth of its recession and implementation problems (see Stevis and 
Talley, 2013), Greece and its lenders agreed to a second €130 billion 
loan agreement in October 2011. The new programme brought addi-
tional austerity measures but also an agreement (‘haircut’) with private 
creditors holding Greek government bonds to lower interest rates and 
accept a 53.5% face loss. The debt-to-GDP ratio, which had skyrocketed 
to a forecasted 198% in 2012, would be reduced to about 160%, with 
a targeted gradual decline until it reached a more sustainable level at 
roughly 120% of GDP by 2020. However, the announcement of Prime 
Minister George Papandreou’s intention of holding a referendum on 
this agreement for the restructuring of Greek debt put it temporarily on 
hold, resulting in his resignation on 6 November 2011, amidst domestic 
and European pressures. 
 These developments paved the way for major political realignment 
in Greece. A coalition government was formed, supported by the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), centre-right New Democracy 
and the smaller right-wing party LAOS, with Lucas Papademos, 
the former ECB Vice-President, being appointed as the new Prime 
Minister. The subsequent May/June 2012 elections saw the formation 
of a new coalition government, this time under the leadership of New 
Democracy’s Antonis Samaras and with the participation of PASOK and 
the Democratic Left (DIMAR) party. The Coalition of the Radical Left 
(SYRIZA) skyrocketed into second place, spearheading the opposition 
to austerity, while the far-right parties Independent Greeks and Golden 
4 Georgios Karyotis and Roman Gerodimos
Dawn entered Parliament for the first time (Karyotis, Rüdig and Judge, 
2014). In the months that followed, the fears of a possible Greek exit 
from the eurozone gradually subsided and Greece appeared to be on 
the path to fiscal recovery, ending a four-year exile period from market 
borrowing in April 2014 (see crisis timeline in Appendix). However, the 
political system remained volatile, with structural and social problems, 
including high unemployment (26% in March 2014) and lack of compe-
tiveness indicating that the crisis is far from over, not only in Greece but 
across the eurozone (Wolf, 2014). 
 With the situation still unfolding, the Greek debt crisis and national 
and international responses to it continue to polarise opinion, raising 
complex questions, among others, about the sustainability of the 
recovery effort and its impact on society and politics. This edited collec-
tion aims to deliberate on the origins, management and implications of 
the Greek crisis, in a comparative context, and in doing so, to generate 
new theoretical perspectives about the politics of extreme austerity 
within and beyond Greece. 
 Key themes and structure 
 The literature on the origins, handling and implications of the eurozone 
and particularly the Greek crises is only starting to extend beyond highly 
ideological or journalistic accounts (e.g., see Ladi and Tsarouhas, 2014; 
Saurugger, 2014). The present volume offers a comprehensive coverage 
of issues relating to austerity politics and the Greek crisis. Drawing on 
a wealth of unpublished primary data, it identifies tensions, interac-
tions and trade-offs between different actors and aspects of the crisis in 
a holistic manner. It also seeks to tackle the Greek case not only from 
a variety of disciplinary perspectives but also in a broader comparative, 
global even, context of crisis governance in a highly interdependent, 
globalised era. 
 The book’s point of departure is that crisis management is centrally 
concerned with exploring answers to the following questions: First, how 
is the crisis framed and represented in public debates and by whom? 
Second, what policies are introduced in response and how effective are 
these in arresting the crisis? Third, what are the implications of these 
frames and policies for society and politics? Fourth, what are the broader 
global phenomena driving or affecting both crises and crisis manage-
ment? To understand austerity politics, it is argued, each of these has 
to be analysed separately and in relation to each other. This is reflected 
in the book’s structure, developed around four respective themes: the 
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framing, the policies, the politics and the comparative analysis of the 
crisis. 
 Any crisis typically generates a contest between competing frames 
concerning its nature and severity, its causes, the responsibility for its 
occurrence or escalation, and its implications for the future (Entman, 
1993). Frames set the parameters and the points of reference for audi-
ences to interpret, categorise and evaluate complex or ambiguous 
events, such as the eurozone crisis (Benford and Snow, 2000; Druckman, 
2001; Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell, 2009). Elites manipulate, strategise 
and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative (‘t 
Hart, 1993; Tarrow, 1994; Brandström and Kuipers, 2003; De Vries, 2004; 
Stone, 2012). These dynamics are explored in  the first section of the book, 
which analyses representations and discourses about the Greek crisis, 
both domestically and at the European level. 
 Making some aspects of a crisis more salient in discourse promotes a 
particular causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recom-
mendation and is directly linked to the policies introduced in an attempt 
to master it (Entman, 1993: 52; Scheufele, 1999). Crises do not only have 
multiple and contested causes but also multiple and contested solutions 
(‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009).  The second section of the book assesses the 
austerity policies implemented in Greece. This includes an evaluation 
of both the general principles of the bailout agreements negotiated with 
the IMF, the EU and the ECB, as well as specific policy reforms in key 
sectors, such as welfare and pensions. 
 The third section of the book explores the politics of the crisis. The 
political dimension is centred around the clash between supporters and 
opponents (both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) of proposed 
reforms (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell, 2009). Its focus is principally on 
analysing the multifaceted consequences of the economic crisis. This 
includes an assessment of protest and voting behaviour at times of 
extreme austerity, a discussion of the emotions and behaviours the crisis 
generates and an analysis of how it is being experienced collectively 
and individually within the Greek society and polity. Read in conjunc-
tion with the previous sections, it is argued that the political ramifi-
cations of the crisis are not only dependent on how it is represented 
and managed but also feed back into these, with the potential to dislo-
cate dominant frames and undermine the successful implementation 
of policy reforms (also see Lowi, 1972; Pierson, 2006; Boin, ‘t Hart and 
McConnell, 2008). 
 The above framework, expanded in the opening chapter, underlines 
the symbiotic, cyclical and dynamic relationship between the frames, 
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policies and politics of the crisis. This provides the glue for the analyses 
of substantial chapters in each respective section, which draw on a range 
of methodological approaches and theoretical literatures, but which 
collectively form an overarching narrative. The  fourth and final section 
of the book contextualises the Greek case, examining ‘the crisis beyond 
Greece’ and offering international perspectives on austerity politics, 
with chapters on Ireland, Spain, Argentina and Turkey. By juxtaposing 
case studies and strategies of crisis management, this section highlights 
common patterns and identifies factors that affect decision-making at 
both the European and the global level. In sum, this book seeks to offer 
a pluralistic but coherent account of austerity politics and to explore 
the perils and limits of crisis management, a question of broader empir-
ical significance and theoretical value. A more detailed overview of the 
book’s contents follows. 
 Content and contributions 
 The book is divided in 14 chapters, spread over its four sections. In the 
first chapter, Andrew Hindmoor and Allan McConnell provide us with 
an analytical toolbox, by drawing on the literature on crisis exploita-
tion and management. Their contribution identifies a number of key 
framing contests around the severity of a crisis, its causes, the motiva-
tions of those involved, who or what is to blame, and what policy meas-
ures should be put into place in order to restore economic, political and 
social stability. The chapter then identifies three key crisis management 
contradictions which are often reflected in bitter debates in the political, 
social and media arenas. These are the tensions between (i) resolving the 
crisis vs. protecting the reputation of government, (ii) political parties 
working together vs. political parties engaging in adversary critique and 
(iii) solutions which maintain established paradigms and power struc-
tures vs. solutions which realign established paradigms and power struc-
tures. Hindmoor and McConnell argue that the way in which a society 
responds to extraordinary crisis episodes is a product of a battleground 
between multiple and competing power structures, interests and move-
ments, whether seeking to preserve as much as possible of the old order, 
or to realise visions of a ‘new’ one. 
 In Chapter 2, Dimitris Papadimitriou and Sotirios Zartaloudis examine 
the evolving narratives of key EU actors during the ‘bailout’ negotia-
tions and unpack the key features of the EU’s strategy to contain and 
resolve the crisis. It is argued that the highly emotive discourse that 
prevailed during the early stages of the Greek drama, sidetracked 
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European policy makers into a strategy that always seemed to produce 
too little, too late, and neglected key structural defaults of the eurozone’s 
governance regime. Building on a discursive institutionalist perspective, 
Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis also argue that the peculiarities of the 
Greek case have served as a ‘critical juncture’ in the (re)definition of 
European discourses on solidarity, competitiveness and ‘mutual respon-
sibility’. These new discourses have not only conditioned understand-
ings on the causes and appropriate remedies of the ‘Greek problem’ but 
have themselves evolved to become a constituent part of a wider iden-
tity crisis for the EU, with significant implications for the future trajec-
tory of the European project. 
 Continuing on the same theme but from the perspective of the Greek 
media, Chapter 3 by Tereza Capelos and Theofanis Exadaktylos anal-
yses the framing of the crisis in op-ed pieces between 2009 and 2012, 
focussing on the stereotypical representation of key actors, such as 
Germany, Greece and the EU. The chapter employs content and discourse 
analysis, identifying blame attribution frames, which underpin the 
public’s confidence in domestic and European actors and institutions. 
Capelos and Exadaktylos find that most pieces provided a simplistic and 
charged account of the crisis, promoting a self-victimising discourse and 
pointing the finger at government and international elites. 
 The second section of the book on the policies of extreme austerity 
begins with a review and evaluation of the first bailout programme 
adopted in Greece in May 2010. Sotiria Theodoropoulou and Andrew 
Watt, in Chapter 4, explore the extent to which the Memorandum 
contained the seeds of its own failure, given the economic context 
in which it had to be implemented. The chapter analyses the main 
premises of the adjustment programme in its original form, drawing 
on the relevant literature in economics and political economy and 
contrasting these assumptions against what was widely known about 
Greece at the time. The authors argue that it would have taken a miracle 
(or several) for the adjustment programme to succeed, even if there had 
been no obstacles to its implementation. On that basis, it is also argued 
that the evaluation of the Greek crisis management contains lessons for 
the handling of other troubled eurozone economies. 
 In Chapter 5, Platon Tinios analyses what the IMF termed ‘a landmark 
pension reform’, the first to pass as a law after the signing of the original 
bailout agreement. Upon its adoption, pensions were declared safe for 
a generation. This, however did not prevent pensions in payment to be 
cut on ten separate occasions between 2010 and early 2013. This chapter 
explores this apparent paradox by noting that the 2010 reform, passed 
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with very little time for preparation, while carrying a heavy legacy of 
chronic inactivity. It is argued that picking reforms ‘off the shelf’ with 
little time to spare and few opportunities of dialogue and reflection, 
condemned the reforms to be backward-looking and oriented towards 
problems of the past. As a result, they produced a revamped monolithic 
state pension system reminiscent of the 1980s rather than a construc-
tion appropriate for the 2020s. The lack of preparation indicates that 
policy makers overlooked the critical role played by the (unreformed) 
pension system in the propagation of the debt crisis: pensions were a 
key ‘microfoundation of disaster’. 
 Another important area undergoing policy reform, the welfare state, 
is studied in Chapter 6. Social solidarity, in Greece more than else-
where, is channelled through the family and other informal support 
networks. The functions of social protection are thus supplied by a 
 hybrid welfare system, composed of the formal welfare state but ‘shad-
owed’ and supplemented by an informal welfare system based on the 
family. This symbiosis is frequently noted but its full implications are 
little appreciated. During the crisis, austerity policies have squeezed the 
finances of the family, leading to possible ‘bankruptcy scenarios’, just as 
greater demands are placed upon it. This chapter by Antigone Lyberaki 
and Platon Tinios maps the scope of the Informal Welfare State and 
offers an interpretation for its persistence in Greece. The authors argue 
firstly, that the hybrid (formal and informal) system of social protection 
has provided one of the drivers of the current crisis in state finances; 
and secondly, that the way the social and political consequences are 
unfolding cannot be seen independently of the complex relationships 
between the formal and informal welfare systems. 
 The third section on the politics of extreme austerity begins with 
Chapter 7, where Georgios Karyotis and Wolfgang Rüdig explore public 
attitudes to austerity and analyse patterns of protest and voting behav-
iour, drawing on original panel data. Findings suggest that while a rela-
tive majority of Greeks on the onset of the crisis found the austerity 
measures to be necessary, virtually all agreed that they were also unfair, 
with about one in four participating in anti-austerity demonstrations. 
The chapter proceeds to analyse the profile of demonstrators and map 
the electoral impact of austerity by discussing voting trends from 2009 
to 2014. It is suggested that the degree of persuasiveness of competing 
political narratives plays an important role in averting or encouraging 
protest, a finding that also tentatively applies to vote choices, which is 
mainly characterised by a strong anti-incumbent effect. 
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 The eighth chapter by Sappho Xenakis and Leonidas Cheliotis anal-
yses the issue of crime during the crisis, which, despite its significance 
within the domestic political arena, has received comparatively little 
scholarly attention. On the one hand, public anger against traditional 
mainstream political parties for their handling of the economy and 
adoption of austerity measures has been further inflamed by concerns 
about criminality, in the form of both elite corruption and common 
crime. On the other hand, in the case of law-and-order policies, crimi-
nality has also proved to be a key means by which established political 
parties have sought to manage this heightened public anger. Xenakis and 
Cheliotis argue that recognition of the importance of crime in efforts 
to manage public anger is not only a necessary step for appreciating 
the direction of politics under crisis and its socio-political ramifications 
within the Greek context; it is equally a step that enhances and extends 
our understanding of the relationship between politics and emotions 
more broadly. 
 In Chapter 9, Athanasia Chalari focuses on the micro-social level, 
providing us with an empirical assessment of citizens’ subjective experi-
ences of and participation in social change in contemporary Greece. As 
with the previous chapter, this is a surprisingly under-researched aspect 
of the Greek case and there are broader lessons regarding crisis manage-
ment and social change from the perspective of the citizen. Employing 
interview data, Chalari suggests that practices, norms and mentalities 
inherited by previous generations are questioned by many. Customs 
(such as clientelism) and mentalities (such as prioritising the personal 
over the collective interest) ought to change and be reformed, as the 
new reality demands different ways of thinking and rapid adaptation 
to a new way of living, which has become economically restricted and 
politically unstable. In this sense, it is argued, Greeks are becoming 
reflexive towards the present situation and about their own role within 
it, as well as critically engaged with both the past and future, as they 
consider which parts of the older generations’ established mentalities to 
retain and which aspects of their way of life to alter. 
 The final, comparative, section of the book begins with Chapter 10, by 
Dimitris Tsarouhas, who compares Greek and Turkish political responses 
to economic crises in 2010 and 2001, respectively. The chapter focuses 
on the reasons some instances of economic crisis lead to a strength-
ening of reform efforts, while others result in inertia and on the role 
that discourse and agents play in promoting or obscuring reform under 
critical circumstances. At structural level, it is argued, although both 
10 Georgios Karyotis and Roman Gerodimos
countries went through a critical juncture in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, these junctures led to diverse policy outcomes. While Turkey’s 
previous path was transformed towards a fully liberalised political 
economy regime, the statist path persisted in Greece. When the crisis 
hit, Greece found itself paralysed and basic political economy reforms 
were put on hold for years. In Turkey, the 2001 crisis acted as a catalyst 
for change and the country found itself on sound economic ground 
within a short space of time. Examining the empirical record by use of a 
discursive institutionalist approach, this chapter argues that communi-
cating the crisis and coordinating the political response to it are crucial 
determinants of policy outcomes. It also underlines the positive or nega-
tive role that influential policy entrepreneurs can play in that process. 
 In their contribution, Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Niamh 
Hardiman explore politics of fiscal efforts in Ireland and Spain 
(Chapter 11). The chapter’s core argument is that although the scale of 
fiscal adjustment that has been expected of Greece is more severe than 
that seen in any other eurozone member state, the politics of austerity 
are problematic in very similar ways. Firstly, attempts at closing the 
fiscal gap require difficult choices about distributive outcomes, whether 
in the form of increased taxes or reduced expenditure, which need to 
be better understood. Secondly, since the success of fiscal adjustment 
is measured with reference to GDP figures that are themselves fluid, 
these policies are tracking a moving target. In these circumstances, 
it is likely that the expected credibility gains, especially with ratings 
agencies, may prove highly elusive, calling into question not only the 
attainability but the very purpose of the austerity measures. Thirdly, 
even if it may be true that austerity, pursued long enough, will even-
tually result in reducing the deficit and ultimately also the debt, this 
cannot be treated only as a technical exercise in economics. In demo-
cratic societies, governments depend on popular support, and this may 
erode faster than the austerity programme requires. These three themes 
are explored with reference to the fiscal adjustment strategies adopted 
by Ireland and Spain since 2008. 
 The Argentine crisis of 2001–02, which stands out as a seminal 
example of extreme austerity, is the focus of Chapter 12 by Sebastian 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda. At the turn of the millennium, Argentina made 
a speedy transition from poster child to basket case. In December 2001, 
following a series of desperate attempts to save a seemingly broken 
economic model, Argentina’s experiment with convertibility and neo-
liberal reforms ended in tragedy: banking crisis, disorderly debt default, 
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widespread social unrest, almost political breakdown. A renewed 
interest in the Argentine case emerged in the wake of the financial 
meltdown of 2008, mainly in the form of ‘lessons from Argentina to 
Greece’. However, more often than not, commentators, from both the 
right and left of the political spectrum, have tended to use Argentina to 
sell competing narratives of the crisis, largely based on their ideological 
predispositions and policy preferences. This chapter seeks to provide a 
more analytical and nuanced account of the politics of austerity and 
crisis management before, during and after the Argentine collapse of 
2001, highlighting the highly political nature of the process of restoring 
market confidence. Dellepiane-Avellaneda finds that it is not only about 
pleasing financial markets by sanctioning tough austerity measures; it 
is also fundamentally about constructing and sustaining electoral and 
distributional coalitions, while key elites battle to impose a dominant 
discourse regarding the causes and policy solutions to the crisis. 
 In Chapter 13, George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece between 
October 2009 and November 2011, provides his own perspective 
on various aspects of the crisis in Greece and Europe, including the 
rationale behind his government’s decisions and actions. It is based on 
a conversation with the editors, which took place in Brussels on 4 April 
2014, which loosely follows the four-part structure of the book, covering 
aspects relevant to the framing, policies, politics and comparative impli-
cations of economic crisis management and extreme austerity. From the 
unique position of leading the country during the worst economic crisis 
of its modern history, Papandreou addresses some of the book’s recur-
ring issues and themes, as well as responds to questions and criticisms 
put forward by other book contributors. Papandreou’s chapter sheds 
light on the complex factors and pressures that affect decision-making 
processes at the domestic, European and global levels – showing how 
increasingly interdependent these domains are. 
 In the concluding chapter 14, we revisit and reflect on the key themes 
discussed in the book, pull together the strands and lessons that recur 
throughout the volume, and explore the broader implications of the 
Greek crisis, for Greece, the European Union and austerity politics in 
general. We argue that the morally charged and stereotypical framing of 
the key players both in Europe and within Greece drew attention away 
from substantive debates and hampered a decision-making process, which 
was already highly problematic, rushed and inadequate. While Greece 
avoided the catastrophe of a disorderly default, bank run or Grexit, and 
now seems to be on a path of recovery, multiple communication and 
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policy failures at all levels of political action had, and are still having, 
a profound impact on the everyday lives of millions of people, as well 
as on the political system as a whole. Importantly, these developments 
in Greece appear to be indications of – and provide us with valuable 
lessons on – much broader structural tensions within the architecture of 
both European and global governance structures. 
 
